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“VIRTUAL CHILD” PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET: A 
“VIRTUAL” VICTIM? 
Child pornography is an exception to First Amendment freedoms 
because it exploits and abuses our nation’s youth.1 The latest trend in 
that industry is “virtual child” pornography. “Virtual child” 
pornography does not use real children or images of real identifiable 
children.  When the object of desire is not a child, but merely a 
combination of millions of computer pixels crafted by a skilled artist, can 
the government ban this allegedly victimless creation?2 
Introduction 
Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) to fight the 
ongoing battle against the sexual exploitation of children.3  However, Congress drafted the CPPA 
very broadly, and with the advancement of technology the statute may encroach on First 
Amendment rights to free speech.4  Most people would agree that the use of actual children in the 
production of sexually explicit videos or photographs is grotesque child abuse.  The question 
remains whether the government may criminalize the production and possession of “virtual child” 
pornography if no child is used in the production of pornography and the images are completely 
fictional.  In Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
government may not criminalize such action because the production of “virtual child” 
pornography does not sexually abuse an actual child.5  The Court rejected the government’s 
argument that “virtual child” pornography encourages pedophiles to abuse children.  This 
argument is the intellectual equivalent of a claim that Romeo and Juliet encourages teenagers to 
kill themselves and should be banned from high school reading lists.  More people would find 
greater social value in Romeo and Juliet than in “virtual child” pornography, but if there is some 
                                                     
1 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982). 
2 Technology advances daily with the invention of computer software used to create realistic 
artwork.  Using a commercial software package, it is possible to create “people” without using an 
actual image.  There is a second type of creation using the process known as “morphing” in which 
the image of an actual person may be altered to create a distinct image.  “‘Morphing’ is short for 
‘metamorphosing,’ a technique that allows a computer to fill in the blanks between dissimilar 
objects in order to produce a combined image.” Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual 
Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439, n.5 (1997).  This 
iBrief discusses only true virtual pornography, not pornography consisting of morphed images. 
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2000). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press”). 
5 Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002). 
social or artistic value to a piece of work, it should be protected under the freedom of speech 
clause of the First Amendment.6  “Virtual child” pornography must be distinguished from actual 
child pornography in order to be protected under the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court held 
the CPPA to be unconstitutional by making the distinction between “virtual” and actual child 
pornography and by doing so, expanded the field of free speech.7 
Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition and the Effect of the Decision 
In Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, the Ninth Circuit held the CPPA to be 
unconstitutional, a decision contrary to those in four other circuits.8  The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split and held that the speech prohibited by the CPPA’s 
ban on “virtual child” pornography is distinguishable from actual child pornography.9  As written, 
§ 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA “abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful 
speech.”10  The Court held that the ban on “virtual child” pornography could not be upheld 
because it was overbroad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
Unlike cases in other circuits, which involved violations of the CPPA, the Free Speech 
Coalition (“the Coalition”) was an association of businesses in the adult-entertainment industry 
that produced and distributed adult material.  The Coalition sought to overturn the law pre-
enforcement, alleging that the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions of the 
CPPA are overbroad and vague.11  The CPPA expanded the ban on child pornography to include 
“any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-
generated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”12    The Coalition argued that the CPPA was not supported by and goes beyond earlier 
decisions regarding obscenity and child pornography,13 extending to images that were not 
obscene or even necessarily offensive, but would prohibit “visual depictions, such as movies, 
                                                     
6 Id. at 1400-01. 
7 Id. at 1405. 
8 See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d (4th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 
F.3d 167 (1st Cir.1999). 
9 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1405. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1392. 
12 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A). 
13 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that pornography can only be banned if it 
is obscene); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (holding that pornography including actual children can be 
prohibited whether or not obscene due to the State’s interest in protecting children exploited by 
the making of the pornography). 
even if they have redeeming social value.”14  Additionally, these provisions would extend to 
items such as reproductions of paintings “depicting a scene from classical mythology” because 
the subject matter “appears to be” minors involved in sexually explicit conduct.15  Even when real 
children are not used (such as in “virtual child” pornography, a Hollywood movie using adult 
actors or a painting or cartoon involving sexually active minors), the CPPA would criminalize 
any depiction of sexually explicit situations involving what appear to be minors.16   
The government presented four arguments supporting the CPPA’s constitutionality.  
First, it claimed that “virtual child” pornography causes indirect harm to actual children,17 
contending that the production of virtual pornographic images can lead to child abuse.18   The 
Court did not accept the government’s indirect harm argument noting instead that “virtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children”19 and that “the causal 
link is contingent and indirect.”20  The government relied on the Ferber case, but to no avail.  The 
Free Speech Coalition court held that Ferber provides no support for the elimination of the 
distinction between actual and “virtual child” pornography.21  In fact, the court in Ferber 
recognized that some works might have societal value as an alternative means of expression.22 
Second, the government argued that “virtual child” pornography could have the tendency 
to persuade the audience to commit crimes.23  The Court struck down this argument, stating, “the 
prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”24  Even 
if virtual pornography encourages unlawful acts, “it is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”25  
“The Government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech that might 
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse” therefore, the government may not 
prohibit the speech expressed in “virtual child” pornography based on this unsupported 
                                                     
14 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1396. 
15 Id. at 1397. 
16 Id. at 1397. 
17 Id. at 1402. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1402. 
21 Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763). 
22 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (stating that “a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked 
younger could be utilized.” The court acknowledged a distinction between actual and virtual child 
pornography.) 
23 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1398. 
24 Id. at 1399 (citing Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 680 
(1959).  See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 577, 566 (1969). 
25 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1403. 
argument.26  The government can punish the perpetrators of sexual abuse of children and punish 
people who provide explicit materials to children in order to seduce or convince the child to 
engage in sexual activities.27  Also, the government may not prohibit adults from material 
protected by free speech in an attempt to prevent children from obtaining it.28   
Third, the government argued that eliminating the market for actual child pornography 
was a sufficient reason for the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the law.29  The Court 
disagreed and noted that the market for actual child pornography might be eliminated if there was 
an alternative source.30  “If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal 
images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes.  Few pornographers 
would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would 
suffice.”31  The Court held that virtual pornography does not necessarily promote the market for 
actual child pornography and recognized the distinction between the two.32  The Court stated that 
the government’s market theory was unpersuasive especially because there is no crime involved 
in “virtual child” pornography since no children are used in the production of the work.33 
Fourth, the government also argued that “virtual child” pornography could result in more 
difficult prosecutions of actual child molesters and pornographers since the virtual images look so 
realistic.34  The government wants to pass this difficulty on to the potential defendant through the 
statute’s affirmative defense option.35 The defendant can rely on the affirmative defense if he can 
prove that the alleged child pornography was made using real persons who were adults and the 
material was not marketed as depicting children.36  The affirmative defense option raises other 
constitutional concerns because the defendant would have the burden of proving that the material 
was protected by the First Amendment.  The Court noted that, “the Government may not suppress 
lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.  Protected speech does not become 
unprotected speech merely because it resembles the latter.”37  All four of the government’s 
                                                     
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.; see also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 




33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1404  
36 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 
37 Id. 
arguments were unsuccessful and the Supreme Court held that the CPPA was unconstitutionally 
overbroad.38 
Should “virtual child” pornography be prohibited?   
The easiest and most popular answer would be yes.  Parents arrested for the online 
sharing of explicit photos of their own children are just one example of how child pornography, 
though extremely socially unacceptable, is an already created and unfortunately booming 
market.39  Banning “virtual child” pornography might spur the actual child pornography market if 
the penalties are the same and it is more expensive to create virtual pornography.  If “virtual 
child” pornography were allowed, the perpetrators of actual child pornography might think twice 
about exploiting real children since there would be a legal and victimless alternative.  “If virtual 
images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the 
market by the indistinguishable substitutes.  Few pornographers would risk prosecution by 
abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.”40   
“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral 
instincts of a decent people.”41  The relevant primary objectives of the government are and should 
be to protect the children from sexual abuse and to prosecute those who abuse children.42 
However, a ban on “virtual child” pornography is not a viable solution for preventing sexual 
abuse.  “Virtual child” pornography could potentially shield children from abuse since pedophiles 
could use this alternative source to fulfill their desires, however repugnant.  Since “virtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children,” the government’s 
interest in preventing the exploitation of children might be too tenuous to enforce.43  If the 
government’s goal truly is to eliminate the sexual exploitation of children, the most logical 
solution would be to find a solution to the illegal market.  It is evident that the current criminal 
statutes do not entirely deter child abusers.44  The Free Speech Coalition court believes that the 
alternative of legal “virtual child” pornography would reduce the production of actual child 
pornography because people could not be punished for the creation or possession of this 
                                                     
38 Id. at 1406. 
39 Connie Cass, 20 Charged in Child Porn Ring, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 10, 2002 at A1. 
40 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1404. 
41 Id. at 1399. 
42 Id. at 1396. 
43 Id. at 1402. 
44 See Cass, supra note 39, at A1. 
substitute.45  In addition, stiffer penalties for actual child pornographers and sexual abusers would 
prevent more abuse than prohibiting “virtual child” pornography as an alternative to abuse.  
New Legislative Attempts to Ban “Virtual Child” Pornography  
The CPPA is unconstitutional as written, but new bills are attempting to re-write the 
legislation to make it an actionable criminal law without violating the First Amendment.  New 
bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate to amend the CPPA 
(now entitled the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002).46  Section 
2256(8)(B) would be amended to read, “such visual depiction is a computer image or computer-
generated image that is, or appears virtually indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”47  The new bills still maintain the prohibition of “virtual child” 
pornography even though the Supreme Court has indicated it is protected speech. 
The bill maintains the affirmative defense to a charge of violating the law if “the alleged 
offense did not involve child pornography produced using a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct or an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense involving such child pornography.”48  
This affirmative defense could be used in the prosecution of an adult actor playing the role of a 
minor in sexually explicit situations in a Hollywood movie.  The affirmative defense could also 
be used by a producer of “virtual child” pornography if the virtual image is “virtually 
indistinguishable” from reality.  This affirmative defense shifts the burden of proof from the 
government to the producer of the work.  In The Free Speech Coalition, the Court emphasized 
that if the government would have a difficult time prosecuting virtual pornographers, then the 
defendant would have just as hard of a time proving his innocence by demonstrating that real 
children were not used especially if the defendant was not the producer but a mere possessor of 
the virtual pornography.49   
On July 17, 2002, a Joint Resolution was proposed to add a constitutional amendment 
respecting real and “virtual child” pornography.50  “Section 1.  Neither the Constitution nor any 
State constitution shall be construed to protect child pornography, defined as visual depictions by 
any technological means of minor persons, whether actual or virtual, engaged in explicit sexual 
activity.  Section 2.  The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate 
                                                     
45 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1404. 
46 H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002); S. 2511, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002). 
47 S. 2511. 
48 S. 2511. 
49 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1404. 
50 H.R.J. Res. 106, 107th Cong. (2002). 
legislation.”51  This proposed amendment is again overbroad and contradicts the First 
Amendment because it would eliminate a substantial subsection of artistically valuable work.  
Hollywood movies and television programs have many examples of visual depictions of “minors” 
engaged in explicit sexual activity.  The proposed amendment bans not only explicit pictures of 
prepubescent children but depictions of 17 year-olds engaged in sexual activities that might not 
be offensive to community standards much like the original CPPA.52     
Conclusion 
The proposed amendment is so broad that it would encompass much of the entertainment 
industry.  Imagine if all the movies depicting minors in sexually explicit situations were removed 
from the store shelves.  Some very popular movies and works of art would suddenly become 
illegal contraband.  It could happen if Congress passes this proposed amendment.  Congress has 
again failed to narrowly tailor the law but hopefully, for the sake of our freedom of speech, the 
proposed amendment shall fail as well.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. The Free 
Speech Coalition indicates that there is a way to tailor the revision of the CPPA without violating 
the First Amendment.53  If the government believes that “virtual child” pornography will be used 
by child abusers to convince their victims to participate in sexual activities,54 Congress could 
narrowly tailor a criminal statute to punish such uses of the materials severely without banning 
the creation and possession of the work.  Banning “virtual child” pornography will not effectively 
protect the nation’s children from perpetrators.  It will simply eliminate a victimless alternative 
that is substantially less repugnant than the abuse of actual children.  The proposed constitutional 
amendment and congressional bills are plagued with the same problem of being overbroad as the 
CPPA and violate the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech.   
By: Dannielle Cisneros 
                                                     
51 H.R.J. Res. 106. 
52 The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1400. 
53 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002). 
54 See The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1402. 
